Russia's next move? The countries trying to Putin-proof themselves

British Air Commodore Andy Turk, the current Deputy Commander of the NATO Airborne Warning and Control Force (AWACS), recalled: "35 years ago, at the age of 18, I joined the Air Force and was immediately sent to Germany, stationed at a 'Tornado' fighter base. It was the end of the Cold War, and we were still undertaking nuclear missions." This early experience shaped his understanding of geopolitical realities.

"After the war, we had hoped for a peace dividend, hoping for progress in geopolitics, but obviously Russia didn't want to do that. Now, my eldest son also aspires to join the Air Force, wanting to make a difference... It feels a bit like history repeating itself," Commodore Turk lamented. The cyclical nature of conflict is a sobering thought for him.

At an altitude of about 30,000 feet over the Baltic Sea, a NATO reconnaissance plane is on a mission, equipped with a huge, shiny mushroom-shaped radar that allows the crew to scan hundreds of miles around for suspicious Russian activity. For a long time, aerial surveillance missions like this, as well as the broader NATO membership, have made the small Baltic countries bordering Russia—Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia—feel secure. This sense of security is paramount for these nations.

However, former US President Donald Trump's closeness to Russian President Vladimir Putin made the Baltic states uneasy. Trump made it clear that, for the first time since World War II, Europe could no longer take US military support for granted. This made these countries, which were annexed by the Soviet Union for 40 years, nervous, even though they are now members of the EU and NATO, Putin still openly believes that the Baltic states should return to Russia's sphere of influence. The historical context fuels their present anxieties.

Ian Bond, deputy director of the Center for European Reform, believes that even if Ukraine eventually reaches a long-term ceasefire agreement, Putin will not stop there. "No one wants to see a war break out in Europe again. But more and more European intelligence officials are telling us that the idea that peace will last forever in Europe is a thing of the past." The changing security landscape necessitates a reassessment of Europe's defense strategies.

Russia's economy is currently in a wartime state, with about 40% of the federal budget going to defense and domestic security. More and more economic resources are being used to produce war materials. "We can see what the Russian economy is being transformed to do," Mr. Bond observed, "It's not for peace." This economic shift underscores Russia's continued military focus.

The northern Estonian city of Narva provides a stark reminder of why the country feels so uneasy. Russia borders Estonia from north to south. Narva is separated from Russia by the river of the same name, with medieval-style fortresses standing on either side—one flying the Russian flag, the other the Estonian flag. A bridge between the two countries is one of the few pedestrian crossings in Europe that remains open to Russia. The proximity and history contribute to the tension.

"We're used to their tricks and tactics," said Egerd Belitšev, head of the Estonian Border Guard Police. "The Russian threat is nothing new to us." He said that there are "constant provocations and tensions" on the border. Border guards have recorded Russian guards removing thermal imaging from buoys in the Narva River used to demarcate the border between the two countries under the cover of darkness. These actions are seen as deliberate attempts to destabilize the region.

"We use aerial equipment—drones, helicopters, and airplanes, all of which use GPS signals—and there's constant GPS jamming. So Russia has a huge impact on the way we carry out our missions." The electronic warfare capabilities of Russia pose a significant challenge to Estonia's security operations.

Last year, Estonia installed dragon's teeth—pyramidal anti-tank obstacles made of reinforced concrete—on the bridge. Although no one believes Russia will send a large number of tanks through, even a few units could cause extreme instability. About 96% of Narva's population speaks Russian as their native language, and many have dual citizenship. Estonia fears that a confident Putin might use Narva and its surrounding large Russian-speaking population as a pretext for invasion, as he has done before in Georgia and Ukraine. This demographic factor adds a layer of complexity to the security concerns.

In response to growing anxiety, Estonia, Lithuania, and Poland jointly announced this week that they are asking their respective parliaments to approve withdrawal from the international treaty banning the use of anti-personnel landmines. The move is intended to give them "greater flexibility" in defending their borders. Lithuania withdrew from the international convention banning cluster bombs earlier this month. These defensive measures reflect a heightened sense of vulnerability.

According to Camille Grand, former Assistant Secretary General for Defence Investment at NATO, Putin is more likely to target non-NATO countries (such as Moldova) than to provoke NATO countries after the Ukraine crisis, because this reduces the risk of international backlash. Grand said that traditionally, Estonia and other Baltic countries have been more vulnerable than NATO's Western European members because they are geographically isolated from alliance members. But this has largely been resolved with Sweden and Finland joining NATO after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. "The Baltic Sea has become a NATO sea," he noted. The expanded NATO presence significantly enhances the region's security.

Dr. Marion Messmer, a senior research fellow in the International Security Program at Chatham House, believes that the most likely trigger for war with Russia is miscalculation, rather than deliberate planning. Dr. Messmer predicts that if a peace agreement is reached in Ukraine, Russia may continue to conduct disinformation campaigns and cyber warfare in Europe, as well as sabotage and espionage in the Baltic Sea. "I think they're likely to continue any form of destabilization, even if we see a peace that is favorable to Ukraine." These ongoing activities contribute to a climate of uncertainty and risk.

Dr. Messmer continued: "One risk I see is that there could be a completely unintentional accident in the Baltic Sea, but that is essentially the result of Russian gray zone activities or brinkmanship, where they think they are in control of the situation, but they are not. This then escalates into a confrontation between a NATO member and Russia, and could escalate into other things." The potential for unintended escalation is a major concern.

Mr. Grand also emphasized that the risk of Putin attacking the Baltic states cannot be completely underestimated. The Russian president is likely to first consider how likely NATO allies are to retaliate. Would the United States, or even France, Italy, or the United Kingdom, risk war with nuclear power Russia for Narva, a small town on Estonia's eastern edge that belongs to NATO? The question of NATO's resolve is central to the security calculus.

What if the events of 2014 in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine were repeated, with Russian paramilitary forces involved in the fighting but not identifying themselves as Russian soldiers? This would allow Putin to make plausible deniability—in this case, would NATO intervene to help Estonia? If it doesn't, Putin may find the benefits of doing so tempting, and the principle of unity of the Western military alliance he hates will be weakened. The ambiguity of such a scenario presents a significant challenge to NATO's decision-making.

It would also destabilize the entire Baltic region, potentially including social, political, and economic aspects, as a Russian invasion—however limited—could scare away foreign investors who see the region as stable. The economic consequences of aggression are a key consideration.

Another concern being discussed in Estonia is that Donald Trump may eventually withdraw or significantly reduce the US military and military presence that has long been stationed in Europe. Estonian Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur bravely addressed these issues when I met him in the capital, Tallinn: "Regarding (US) troops, we don't know what the US government's decision will be." The uncertainty surrounding US commitment adds to the region's anxieties.

"They have made it very clear that they will focus more on the Pacific, and they have made it clear that Europe must take more responsibility for Europe. We agree with that. We must believe in ourselves and trust our allies, including the Americans... I am very confident that even attacking a small part of Estonia is an attack on (all) NATO." Pevkur added: "Then, that is the question for all allies, all 32 member states: are we united?" The question of collective defense remains paramount.

In the Baltic states and Poland—what NATO calls the "eastern flank" close to Russia—this new, lingering insecurity, or at least uncertainty, is evident in the legislation being debated and implemented in the region. Poland recently announced that all adult men in the country must be prepared to fight, and a new military training program will be in place by the end of the year. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk has also expressed interest in sharing France's nuclear umbrella with European allies in case the US withdraws its nuclear shield. These measures reflect a heightened state of preparedness.

Voters living in the Baltic states do not need to be persuaded to devote a large portion of public funds to defense. For example, Estonia is introducing a new law requiring all newly built office and apartment buildings of a certain size to include bunkers or air-raid shelters. Tallinn has also just announced that it will spend 5% of its gross domestic product on defense starting next year. Lithuania is aiming for 5-6%, and Poland will soon spend 4.7% of its gross domestic product on defense—it hopes to build Europe's largest army, surpassing the UK and France. (By comparison, the United States spends about 3.7% of its gross domestic product on defense, and the United Kingdom spends 2.3%, with a target of increasing it to 2.6% by 2027.) The significant investment in defense underscores the region's commitment to security.

The decisions made by these countries close to Russia are likely related to their hope, which they have not yet given up, of maintaining the support of Trump and his security guarantees. He reiterated his previously stated position this month: "If (NATO countries) don't pay, I won't protect them. No, I won't protect them." As for how much annual spending the Trump administration considers "enough," US Ambassador to NATO nominee Matthew Whitaker declared that "the minimum level of defense spending is 5%, thereby ensuring that NATO becomes the most successful military alliance in history." The mixed messages from Washington create uncertainty and necessitate a diversified approach to security.

With mixed messages coming from Washington, Estonia is increasingly relying on the reliable support of its European allies. The United Kingdom plays a key role in this regard. The UK has 900 personnel stationed in Estonia, which is currently the UK's largest permanent overseas deployment. The UK has pledged to increase its troop presence in the region. The UK's commitment provides a crucial element of reassurance.

At the base in Tapa, we found huge, echoing hangars filled with armored vehicles. "As we go to the far end of the hangar, you'll see the 'Challenger' main battle tanks," explained Major Alex Humphreys, one of the commanders of the forces stationed in Estonia for a six-month rotation. "(They) are a very key part of the capability. This is a very good opportunity for the British Army." The presence of advanced military equipment enhances the region's defensive capabilities.

When asked if Estonia had requested an increased troop presence from the UK because it felt more vulnerable, he told me: "I think the whole of NATO feels exposed. This is a very important flank for our collective defense, that is, the east. Everyone in the Baltic and Eastern Europe feels a very prominent and clear threat from the Russian Federation. We don't want a war, but if there is a war, we are fully integrated; fully prepared to take lethal action against the Russian Federation to protect Estonia." The integrated defense posture aims to deter aggression and ensure a coordinated response.

However, ultimately, unless directly attacked, the specific conditions under which British bilateral forces or NATO forces will take military action depend on the political decisions made at the time. Therefore, Estonia will not take it for granted. That's why it is busy conducting new army bunker stress tests on its border with Russia and investing in drone technology. Although Estonia's armed forces are not sufficient to repel a Russian attack alone, Estonia is studying the lessons learned from invaded Ukraine—Estonia really hopes it will not share Ukraine's fate. The focus on preparedness and resilience reflects a determination to defend against potential aggression.