What does the report into Israeli military failures on October 7 say?

The Israeli military conducted an investigation into a series of failures surrounding the Hamas-led attacks of October 7, 2023, acknowledging that the military's failure to prevent the attacks was a "complete failure." This assault exposed multiple shortcomings within the Israeli military regarding intelligence, strategy, and operational readiness, revealing systemic vulnerabilities that require immediate attention and reform.

Investigators stated that it was a highly coordinated attack meticulously planned over several years. Hamas-led militants breached the Gaza Strip, attacking Israeli communities and a music festival along the border. This attack resulted in a significant number of casualties and the abduction of hostages, highlighting the devastating consequences of the intelligence and strategic failures.

The attacks resulted in 1,139 deaths and the capture of approximately 250 people. The report detailed a long-standing misunderstanding of the risks posed by Hamas, a rejection of warning signs of an impending attack, and the military's inability to coordinate a response. The report revealed numerous failures by the Israeli military on October 7, emphasizing the urgent need for comprehensive reforms and improved preparedness.

The report noted that the military had a "fundamental misunderstanding" of Hamas for decades, leading senior officers to underestimate the group's capabilities and intentions. Military planners believed that Hamas did not pose a significant threat to Israel and was not interested in a large-scale war. They also believed that Hamas's tunnel network had been greatly weakened, and any cross-border threat would be easily thwarted by Israel's high-tech barrier.

Despite warning signs, such as unusual activity by Hamas militants, Israeli authorities insisted that the group was focused on maintaining its rule in the Gaza Strip and would attack Israel with rockets rather than a large-scale ground invasion. They also misjudged Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, believing that he was "not interested in a broader war," thus overlooking crucial indicators of the impending assault.

The report stated that in the hours leading up to the attack, the Israeli military either ignored or misinterpreted several signs indicating an imminent attack. On the night before the attack, several female observers alerted commanders to unusual activity along the border. Additionally, officers reported a large number of activations of Israeli SIM cards known to be in the hands of Hamas militants, as well as suspicious movements in Hamas rocket deployments.

However, commanders instead relied on what they described as "reassuring signs" that Hamas was merely conducting military exercises. According to the report, Hamas began considering the October 2023 invasion as early as 2016. However, Israeli intelligence dismissed such reports as "unrealistic," believing that Hamas had been deterred by Israel's response to the May 2021 uprising, during which Israel killed 232 people in Gaza.

The Israeli military later realized that Hamas had decided to launch the attack as early as April 2022. By September of that year, it was 85% ready, and in May 2023, it set October 7 as the date. Investigators found that the military was unprepared for the attack, and the deployment of troops was significantly delayed, allowing Palestinian militants to continue their advance without immediate resistance, underscoring the critical need for improved readiness and rapid response capabilities.

The report also noted that the Israeli Air Force had difficulty distinguishing between Hamas militants and Israeli civilians. While the report avoided providing specific details, the military acknowledged that some Israelis were killed by friendly fire. At the same time, investigators found that many aircraft were deployed to attack the homes of senior Hamas commanders in Gaza instead of defending attacked civilians and soldiers, raising concerns about the prioritization of targets during the conflict.

According to several Israeli newspapers, the Hannibal Directive was indeed issued, resulting in numerous civilian deaths. The Hannibal Directive instructs the Israeli military to use all possible force to prevent the capture of Israeli combatants, including killing anyone around them. The Israeli daily Haaretz reported that the directive was issued during the attacks, contributing to the tragic loss of civilian lives.

Consequently, on October 7, orders were issued for Israeli forces to prevent Hamas from returning to Gaza with captives "at any cost," including killing non-combatants. Some pilots flying over the battlefield reportedly hesitated to carry out the directive, sometimes ceasing fire altogether out of concern for hitting civilians. Nevertheless, subsequent investigations revealed that some civilians were killed as a result of the Hannibal Directive, highlighting the ethical dilemmas and tragic consequences of such protocols.

Leading up to the attacks, key warnings, such as increased militant activity and intelligence reports, were either ignored or misinterpreted. The Israeli military's assessments underestimated the scale of the attack, and poor communication and intelligence sharing between commanders exacerbated the failures. The Israeli military's response to the Hamas-led attacks was slow, and reinforcements arrived too late, revealing systemic deficiencies in intelligence assessment, communication, and rapid deployment capabilities.

Notably, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his right-wing coalition have repeatedly blocked similar investigations into the government's actions before and after the attacks. Accountability at the political level remains absent, raising concerns about government transparency and accountability, and highlighting the need for a comprehensive and impartial inquiry into the political and strategic decisions that contributed to the failures.