Negotiators from Israel and Hamas never met face-to-face, but at the end, they were only one floor apart. The ceasefire talks, mediated by Qatar, Egypt, and the United States, had been ongoing for months, punctuated by moments of despair. Now, the key players were gathered in a building in Doha, and the pace had become exceptionally intense.
A deal had been close before, but there had also been previous setbacks: one source revealed that last-minute efforts were made to prevent the agreement from collapsing, with the Qatari Prime Minister’s podium already prepared to announce the deal. A source familiar with the negotiations said, "The talks went right up to 10 minutes before the press conference, it was that last minute." The BBC interviewed officials from all sides involved in the negotiations to understand how the final days of this secretive process unfolded.
The agreement did not come out of thin air. The overall framework of the agreement reached on January 15th was broadly similar to the plan outlined by US President Joe Biden in his White House speech last May. It adopted the same three-stage approach: a ceasefire, the release of Israeli hostages in exchange for Palestinian prisoners, and a gradual withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza. However, sources familiar with the discussions agree that the dynamic of the negotiations shifted decisively in mid-December, and the pace changed accordingly.
Hamas, heavily impacted by the killing of its leader Yahya Sinwar by Israel in Gaza two months prior, became increasingly isolated. Its ally Hezbollah in Lebanon was also heavily impacted and agreed to a ceasefire with Israel. The Iranian-backed government of Bashar al-Assad in Syria was also on the ropes. The view in Washington was that Hamas was forced to abandon the idea that "the cavalry was going to come and save it," as one US official put it. A senior Biden administration official familiar with the negotiations said, "It's hard to overstate the fundamental change in the situation and what that did to Hamas' calculations."
An unnamed Israeli official said that Hamas was "not in a rush" to make a deal and had been "calling the shots" rather than negotiating. They said that things changed after the death of Sinwar and Israeli actions against Hamas' allies in the region. Furthermore, the official stated that "two US administrations" - the Biden administration and the incoming Trump team - created "momentum." The official added, "It was only when the conditions changed that it became possible for us to reach such a deal."
On December 12th, Biden's negotiating team visited Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. White House National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, Middle East envoy Brett McGurk, and CIA Director Bill Burns were all present. An unnamed US official said the meeting lasted "for hours" and focused on the "new regional situation" and "how to transition from the ceasefire in Lebanon to the next round of intensive discussions about Gaza." At this point, another piece was added to the chessboard: Donald Trump.
On December 16th, weeks after Trump's victory, the BBC interviewed a Hamas official who expressed unusual optimism about the ceasefire efforts, indicating they seemed to be taking things more seriously. The official, who had participated in every round of negotiations since November 2023, seemed reassured by a message sent by an advisor to the incoming US president to the mediators, suggesting that Trump wanted a deal before he took office. Trump had also warned that if Hamas did not agree to release the hostages, it would "pay the full price," but the Palestinian official was defiant. "This time, the pressure won't be just on Hamas like it was with the Biden administration," the official said. "Netanyahu will also be under pressure. He's the one blocking the deal, and Trump seems to be aware of that."
However, the official's prediction of a pre-Christmas deal proved too optimistic. Throughout December, the process remained fraught with problems. Israel publicly ruled out the release of certain high-profile prisoners, while the White House accused Hamas of creating obstacles over the release of hostages. A Biden administration official said, "Hamas refused to agree - this was the sticking point at the time - on the list of hostages to be released in the first phase of the agreement." The official added, "It was that fundamental. It's a deal to release hostages. Unless you agree on the list of hostages to be released, there's no deal."
The same official said Hamas made "utterly untrue" claims about not knowing the whereabouts of the hostages, adding, "We held the line and basically walked away from the table until Hamas agreed on the list of hostages." An unnamed Israeli official said that Hamas was trying to conceal the number of hostages alive and "trying to dictate that they would only send us corpses." Hamas, in turn, claimed that Israel had unexpectedly added 11 names to the list of hostages it wanted released in the first phase. Hamas argued that they were reserve soldiers and therefore did not qualify for release alongside women, the injured, and elderly hostages in the first phase.
The door remained open for continued efforts by Qatari and Egyptian mediators. On January 3rd, a breakthrough seemed to occur when Hamas offered to release 110 Palestinian prisoners serving life sentences. There were now clear terms of reference for such a deal. For every hostage released by Hamas, Israel would have to provide what was called a "key" in the draft agreement - this meant an agreed number of Palestinian prisoners, or even specific identities. A US official said, "There was an equation for how many Palestinian prisoners would be released. For example, for female soldiers, there was a key. For elderly men, there was a key. For female civilians, there was a key. All of this was worked out, and there were hundreds of names on the list." In negotiations, the exchange documents of Palestinian prisoners for hostages held by Hamas were called "keys."
At this stage of the negotiations, Hamas also made concessions on two long-standing demands: a full withdrawal of Israeli forces in the first phase and a formal Israeli commitment to a full ceasefire. Egyptian mediators, sensing a breakthrough, urgently dispatched Major General Ahmed Abdel-Khaleq, who is in charge of Palestinian affairs in the Egyptian intelligence service, to Doha. After meeting with Hamas representatives, he confirmed that the group would make what a senior Hamas official called "painful concessions." But according to a Palestinian official, on January 6th, Israel rejected Hamas's offer regarding 11 hostages. Hamas's response was to send the BBC and other media outlets a list containing the names and ages of 34 Israeli hostages. Two days later, the body of one of those on the list - Youssef Al-Zayyadni - was found in Gaza.
The list included reserve soldiers, indicating that Hamas was willing to release them in the first phase. This seemed to be an attempt to embarrass Netanyahu and mobilize the families of hostages in Israel and around the world to pressure him to accept the deal. It also showed that Hamas was not giving up. In the final stages of the negotiations, meetings continued into the early hours of the morning during the hot nights in Doha.
According to multiple officials familiar with the details, over the past month, the negotiations had developed into what was called "proximity talks," with both sides in the same two-story building. A senior US official said the Hamas delegation was on the ground floor, and the Israeli delegation was upstairs. Mediators passed notes between them. Maps of Israeli troop withdrawal plans, as well as details about hostages or prisoners to be released, were passed back and forth. The official said, "It took a huge amount of work, and I have to say, all of that really wasn't fully nailed down until the (final) hours." Inside the building, delegations met separately with senior Qatari and Egyptian officials. The Qatari Prime Minister, Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, was also closely involved in the details.
In the final phase of negotiations, there were two key areas that needed to be resolved: the lists of hostages held by Hamas and Palestinian prisoners held by Israel to be released, and the location of the withdrawal of Israeli forces from densely populated areas of Gaza in the first phase. By January 9th, the pressure had escalated. Trump's envoy, Biden's envoy, and the head of Egyptian intelligence gathered in Doha for a serious eight-hour negotiation. A senior Egyptian official told the BBC, "We were at the closest point to a deal." The two sides had agreed on 90% of the outstanding issues, but further negotiations were still needed. Trump's newly appointed Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff, was dispatched to Tel Aviv to meet with Netanyahu. Although not yet officially in office, the New York real estate mogul was increasingly involved in the negotiations, which Trump was very focused on.
He was about to be sent on what would prove to be a crucial mission. When Trump's Middle East envoy arrived in Israel on January 11th, it was the Sabbath. Witkoff was asked to wait until after the Sabbath to meet with Netanyahu, but the envoy broke with tradition and demanded an immediate meeting with the Prime Minister. Netanyahu appeared to be subjected to some serious hardball during the meeting, and the intervention of the Trump camp, in order to get the Israeli government to drop its final reservations, appeared to be crucial. The atmosphere of the meeting was reportedly tense, and the message from the incoming president to Netanyahu was clear: Trump wanted a deal - and to get it done now. An unnamed Israeli official, commenting on these negotiations, said it was a "very important meeting."
When Witkoff returned to Doha, he remained in the negotiation room, spending time with Biden's envoy, Mr. McGurk, in what two US officials described as an "almost unprecedented" transition effort in US diplomacy. This week, Hamas official Bassem Naim told an Arab TV station that he "could not imagine (the deal) being possible without the pressure from the incoming Trump administration," and specifically mentioned Witkoff's presence in the negotiations. By now, news that a deal was potentially close was out in the open, and public expectations were rising - especially among the families of those held hostage and displaced Palestinians inside Gaza.
According to one source, the final 72 hours of negotiations involved a constant back-and-forth on the details of how the agreement would be implemented. A source close to the negotiations described the finalization of the "arrangements and logistics" for how hostages would be released in Gaza and the withdrawal of Israeli troops. On January 12th, a senior Palestinian official familiar with the negotiations said that "all the officials were in the same building," adding, "Tonight is decisive. We are only a few steps away from a deal." That meeting lasted six hours, but as on many previous occasions, a stalemate emerged. This time, the disagreement was over the mechanisms for the return of displaced people from southern Gaza to the north.
Israel wanted to search returnees and their vehicles to ensure no militants or military equipment were being transported, which Hamas refused to accept. Mediators proposed that technical teams from Qatar and Egypt conduct the searches. Both sides agreed, and the last remaining sticking point was resolved. Just after 6 p.m. on January 15th, a Hamas negotiator wrote in a message to the BBC: "It's all over." The podiums were being prepared. A deal that once seemed impossible had taken shape.