How Syrian mutinies and betrayal sunk Iran's support for Assad

At midnight on November 27th, all reports reaching the Syrian army's military operations room in Aleppo indicated that the situation was collapsing entirely. A fierce rebel offensive that began at dawn had resulted in heavy casualties among soldiers in multiple units in the Aleppo countryside.

Major General Muhammad Salman Saftali, an officer in the Syrian Republican Guard responsible for commanding the army's response, realized that this was no minor skirmish. This rebel attack was the largest and most coordinated since Syrian forces, backed by Russia and Iran, retook Aleppo in 2016, signaling a significant escalation in the conflict.

Saftali had no choice but to request support and appeal to the Syrian government's allies. These allies had decisively intervened militarily on numerous occasions over the past 13 years, tipping the scales of the war in favor of Bashar al-Assad. He invited commanders to an emergency meeting at the military operations room, located north of the officers' club in the Furqan district of central Aleppo, at 6:00 AM.

According to a Syrian paramilitary commander who was present, attendees included Brigadier General Kiumars Purhashemi, the highest-ranking Iranian military advisor in Syria, two Lebanese Hezbollah commanders, and officers from various security branches. Syrian officers complained that their troops were exhausted, ill-equipped, and ill-prepared, and expressed that corruption and nepotism within the army were severely affecting the soldiers' morale.

Hashimi responded by questioning their loyalty to Assad and their ability to control their soldiers, the Syrian commander said. "The argument between the two sides became very heated," he recalled. Suddenly, an officer grabbed an AKM assault rifle from a guard and sprayed Purhashemi with bullets, the Syrian commander told Middle East Eye. This account was corroborated by commanders from two Iraqi armed factions who were active in Syria at the time.

Sources say that Purhashemi was killed, and a Hezbollah commander was wounded, before Saftali's personnel could wrestle the rifle away from the officer. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard mourned Purhashemi in a brief statement released by Iran's state news agency, Tasnim, saying only that he had been killed in Aleppo "in an attack launched by terrorist Takfiri mercenaries." "This is shocking. The killer is a Syrian officer. He is an officer of Assad, not an opponent," the Syrian commander said. "That moment was the real beginning of the collapse of the Syrian army. Betrayal has deeply struck the ranks of Syrian army commanders."

Throughout the Syrian war, Iran has been Assad's most crucial ally. Tehran has provided military support, financial aid, and strategic backing, which, along with Russia's assistance, has enabled the Syrian president to remain in power. Iranian-backed armed factions have played a decisive role in key battles, ensuring Assad's survival against rebel forces and international pressure. However, the bullets that struck Purhashemi's chest triggered a domino effect that neither Assad nor his allies, whom he had begun to alienate a year earlier, could stop.

Sources say that Purhashemi's killing by a Syrian officer "destabilized" the army in Aleppo and encouraged dozens of officers and their soldiers to disobey orders and refuse to fight, further weakening the city's western defenses. Most shockingly, a mutiny occurred within the Baqir Brigade, a large and powerful paramilitary organization that had been armed, trained, and funded by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps since 2012. The brigade's commanders and fighters turned against their sponsors, even firing upon them, which constituted "another painful blow" to the Iranians in Syria within hours, three sources said.

"It might be understandable for them to refuse to fight, but it is incomprehensible that they turned against us and shot our fighters," the Syrian commander said. "Dozens of martyrs and wounded who were evacuated that day had wounds in their backs." Ayman Tamimi, a specialist in the Syrian war, also learned from a paramilitary source that Iranian and Lebanese advisors, as well as some Syrian officers, were "liquidated" by "traitor officers." "Some Iranian-backed fighters were more willing to try and stick it out and continue the fight, seeing Syria as key to the Axis of Resistance and actually believing in the cause," he told Middle East Eye.

The rapid turn of events prompted the Iranian field command to issue an urgent order to its affiliated forces to withdraw from the front lines until further notice. Some units retreated to the Abu Dhuhur airbase, 45 km south of Aleppo, while the rest headed to the Nayrab airbase to the east, three commanders said. By the end of November 28, all areas in the western Aleppo countryside had fallen into the hands of the Syrian opposition.

Meanwhile, Major General Suheil al-Hassan's elite special operations forces, trained and equipped by Russia, arrived in the eastern suburbs of Aleppo and were stationed in Nayrab. The retreating foreign forces were relieved to see Hassan and his troops arrive. His elite force is known as the Tiger Forces, a name derived from its reputation for formidable combat prowess. But the Syrian commander said that Hassan "quarreled" with the retreating forces, telling them to "stop fighting and retreat to Damascus." The 25th Division, led by Major General Saleh Abdullah, also arrived in the suburbs of Aleppo to reinforce the Syrian army there and took up positions at Nayrab airport.

However, neither Hassan nor his former deputy, Abdullah, mounted a defense there. Instead, they retreated to Hama, where they would put up resistance. Fighting was concentrated in the town of Qamhana, 8 km north of Hama, and at the nearby military base in Jebel Zaynal-Abidin. Here, the Syrian army and its allies put up their most stubborn resistance, holding off the rebels for two days. Sources close to pro-Assad forces told Middle East Eye that the concentration of forces and the rebels' unfamiliarity with the area (they had not been active in the area for years) helped them to temporarily stop the attackers.

Finally, on December 4, the rebels entered Hama as the city's defenders melted away. Three days before Hama fell, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi arrived in Damascus to meet with Assad. Araghchi said that he traveled to the Syrian capital to discuss ways in which Tehran could support Assad and his government. However, the more pressing and unpublicized mission was to quickly and safely transport Brigadier General Javad Ghaffari, a senior Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander who played a key role in the 2016 capture of Aleppo, Iraqi commanders told Middle East Eye. His arrival was announced the next day by Iranian media, a message that stopped the rebel advance for 24 hours, one Iraqi commander said. "The Iranian leadership needed to assess the local situation and regain the initiative," he said.

Ghaffari immediately headed to Homs. Syria's third-largest city and its province are a vital transportation hub at the heart of the land route between Tehran, Iraq, Syria, and Beirut, the commander said. It also connects Assad's coastal heartland with Damascus. Losing Homs would sever Hezbollah's land supply lines and destroy Iran's influence in Syria. "Defend Homs at all costs" was the first directive that all foreign forces in Syria received after Ghaffari arrived and took command of the city, the commander said.

Ghaffari got to work. Earthen barriers were set up in the northern suburbs of Homs, and troops were redeployed in anticipation of what seemed like an inevitable showdown. He also advised the Syrian and Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps leadership that reinforcements should be sent to Homs, including Hezbollah and fighters from Iraqi factions. The Syrian army was still experiencing massive desertions, and Ghaffari believed that an influx of allies from abroad would help boost morale. He needed the Russian forces stationed at Hmeimim and Tartus to allow Iranian planes to transport them first.

Hezbollah responded, days after reaching a ceasefire agreement with Israel following more than a year of punishing clashes, by sending 2,000 fighters to Homs. Most were fighters from Quwat al-Ridha, who were stationed in Qusayr and the Damascus countryside, according to the Syrian commander. The rest belonged to the Imam Mahdi Soldiers Brigade, who had withdrawn from Aleppo and the nearby Shia towns of Nubl and Zahraa. Although both units were part of Hezbollah and led by Lebanese commanders, their fighters were Syrian.

The Iraqi armed factions responded less enthusiastically. Since November, Iraq had been facing immense international pressure, with repeated threats of Israeli attacks unless Iraqi forces stopped attacking it with missiles and drones. They believed that supporting Assad at this stage would come at a huge cost and could jeopardize everything they had gained in Iraq since 2003, so they unanimously rejected Ghaffari's request, Iraqi commanders told Middle East Eye. Any Iraqi intervention was left to the decision of the government in Baghdad.

Qais al-Khazali, the head of Asaib Ahl al-Haq, one of the most powerful armed factions in Iraq, said that they did not see a need for "unofficial intervention" this time. "What is happening in Syria in 2024 is different from what happened in 2011," he said in a recent television interview. Khazali defined the 2011 uprising as "terrorism," saying that its goal was to "stir up chaos and sectarian strife." At that time, Shia fighters poured into the country, vowing to protect important holy sites from Sunni rebel groups. This time, Khazali said, there was an "internationally backed political project," and the danger was directed squarely at the Iraqi state. When Assad formally requested Iraqi intervention, he was refused.

Russia also rejected three Iranian requests to allow Iranian planes to transport fighters, weapons, and equipment to Syria, "citing that it could not guarantee the safety of these planes," an Iraqi commander told Middle East Eye.

Everyone expected the battle for Homs to be fierce and decisive. By the time the rebels reached the towns of Talbiseh and Rastan, Ghaffari was convinced that he had addressed all possible vulnerabilities and that the forces he had deployed "shoulder to shoulder" with the regular Syrian army would not let him down. It was then that Syrian soldiers on the rear lines suddenly began shooting at the Hezbollah fighters in front of them, killing eight and wounding dozens. "At that moment, the Iranians realized that the Syrian army had betrayed them and that they had completely lost the support of the Syrian people," an Iraqi commander told Middle East Eye. "This was a critical moment that required a bold decision. Fighting was no longer possible in forces where they no longer knew who was with them and who was against them."

"To save what could be saved," Ghaffari ordered all forces affiliated with him to immediately withdraw from Homs and all of Syria, the commander said. He and the Afghan fighters of the Fatemiyoun Brigade retreated to Latakia airport. They remained there until Russia allowed four Iranian planes to evacuate them days later. Iraqi security officials told Middle East Eye that among the forces evacuated from Hmeimim base that day were 94 Iraqi fighters, mainly from Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba. Hezbollah retreated to Qusayr, while fighters from local Syrian factions withdrew to Sayyida Zeinab, south of Damascus. Some later fled across the Lebanese border to Beirut.

As for the Iraqis in Damascus, some left for Baghdad, while others who had lived in Syria with their families for years also headed to Lebanon. Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba fighters stationed in Abu Kamal and Deir ez-Zor in eastern Syria retreated to the other side of the Iraqi border. The Fatemiyoun Brigade forces stationed there also left, heading to Tehran and Afghanistan via Baghdad. Iraqi security officials told Middle East Eye that 17 buses, each carrying 40 to 50 fighters from the Fatemiyoun Brigade, abandoned everything and fled Syria across the Iraqi border.

"Unfortunately, what happened in those days clearly proved that what we were saying was true, that leaders in the inner circle around Assad were traitors," an Iraqi commander told Middle East Eye. He pointed out that Hezbollah and Iranian commanders had been killed by Israel more than a year earlier, minutes after leaving Damascus airport, and that Iraqi factions had repeatedly warned the Iranians that they were being betrayed by Syrian officers. "The collapse of the Syrian regime is the inevitable result of Assad's arrogance and his abandonment of old allies. Assad's choices in recent years have backfired," he said. "We do not regret the collapse of the Assad regime. This is not a loss. The real loss is the land corridor, for which we have sacrificed so much in recent years."