Analysis: Russia, Iran strengthen alliance after Syria setback

Iran and Russia have officially signed a long-delayed cooperation agreement, a move that further strengthens ties between the two countries as they both face increasing geopolitical pressure. The 20-year agreement, signed in Moscow by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Russian President Vladimir Putin, aims to deepen military and defense cooperation, and includes a clause that neither party will allow its territory to be used for any action that threatens the security of the other, nor provide any assistance to any forces that attack the other.

Discussions about such an agreement have been ongoing for years, but the current situation has made the need for an agreement more pressing. For Russia, the war in Ukraine has weakened its geopolitical position; while Iran, in addition to facing similar Western sanctions as Russia, also faces attacks and weakening by Israel on its various allies in the region, as well as the collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria in early December.

Arguably, the situation in Syria is a key factor driving the strengthening of relations between the two countries, both of whom lost an important ally after Assad's downfall, thereby weakening their influence in the broader Middle East. Moscow and Tehran were both ultimately willing to abandon Assad as they were caught off guard by the opposition's advance. But now, they seem committed to strengthening bilateral relations. This is reflected in the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement signed during Pezeshkian's official visit to Moscow.

The agreement builds not only on the cooperation between Russia and Iran on the Ukraine issue and in circumventing Western sanctions, but also on the "North-South Transport Corridor" project, an initiative advocated by Moscow to facilitate trade from Asia to Russia. This route, designed to bypass geopolitical bottlenecks such as the Suez Canal and the Baltic Sea, favors a land corridor through Iran, Azerbaijan, and the Caspian Sea.

Before the outbreak of the Syrian war in 2011, both Moscow and Tehran had established strategic partnerships with Damascus. Russia's partnership was based on the Tartus naval base established in 1971, aimed at projecting power in the Mediterranean, and the Khmeimim air base established in 2015, initially to provide air support to Assad against the Syrian opposition. Over time, this air base has played a key role in Moscow's operations in Africa.

Meanwhile, Iran deepened its relationship with Syria during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, stemming from a consensus in Tehran and Damascus against Western interference in the region. Syria became an important conduit for the Lebanese Shiite organization Hezbollah, which is part of Iran's "Shia Crescent" and "Axis of Resistance." As the war progressed, the strategic interests of Iran and Russia converged in Syria, particularly in 2015, when both intervened forcefully to prevent the opposition's victory.

Russia's military intervention in 2015 stabilized the Assad regime, and Iranian-backed militias played a decisive role in reversing the course of the conflict. "Since then, the relationship between Russia and Iran has expanded," Kirill Semenov, a non-resident expert at the Russian International Affairs Council, told Al Jazeera. "After 2020, events in Syria had little impact on Russian-Iranian relations, and the two countries' relations developed in many new directions."

These new directions include expanded military cooperation and economic ties, with Tehran and Moscow circumventing Western sanctions through alternative banking mechanisms and energy deals. Iran has also positioned itself as a key transit hub for Russia's "North-South Transport Corridor," providing an important trade route to Asia. Relations between the two countries have also deepened since the Russian-Ukrainian war, with Russia using Iranian-supplied drones, stemming from their shared interest in countering US global hegemony. Both countries are seeking an alternative to the US-led global order, with Iran viewing Russia as a partner in its shift to the East.

Iran's accession to the BRICS group in 2023 (of which Russia is already a member) can be seen as part of this effort. BRICS provides a platform for cooperation, and Iran is seeking to join and integrate into a multipolar economic bloc that aligns with its goals. "Establishing a multipolar world and countering the expansionist plans of the US and the Western bloc remains at the core of Russian-Iranian cooperation," Semenov said.

Hamidreza Azizi, a visiting fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, said it is this strategy of a common enemy that has brought Iran and Russia closer together. "The two sides have taken steps to elevate their relationship to some kind of strategic partnership, especially in areas such as military and security cooperation, and more recently in economic cooperation, aimed at circumventing sanctions and adapting to the negative effects of economic pressure from the West," Azizi said.

Although the cooperation agreement signed on Friday marks a deepening of the partnership, it does not include a mutual defense clause and does not constitute a formal alliance, unlike the treaty Russia signed with North Korea last year. This may reflect the limitations of the relationship between Iran and Russia, which have already become apparent in Syria.

In Syria, Tehran and Moscow have failed to find common ground and have often undermined each other or failed to meet the challenges of rebuilding the country. For example, in 2017, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin made it clear that his country would be the only one to rebuild Syria's energy sector. Iran, eager to profit from the reconstruction of Syria, was shut out by Assad and Moscow, with one Iranian lawmaker warning that Iran was being "sacrificed."

The new Syrian government may also become a point of contention between Russia and Iran, with Moscow maintaining a more conciliatory stance. Azizi pointed out that the consequences of Assad's downfall for Russia and Iran will depend on many variables, including "whether Russia has reached some behind-the-scenes agreements or understandings with the US, Turkey, and [former] Syrian rebels as part of a comprehensive package that could include Syria and Ukraine."

"For example, if Russia is able to maintain its military bases in Syria, albeit on a reduced scale, and if an agreement to end the war in Ukraine is reached after US President-elect Donald Trump takes office, Russia may actually feel less need for Iranian support in various aspects of Syria and Ukraine," Azizi added, although he believes that the possibility of any fundamental change in Iranian-Russian relations is unlikely, given the "continuous deepening of cooperation" in recent years.

Disagreements may also arise in other areas, particularly on the issue of nuclear weapons, with the West accusing Iran of seeking nuclear weapons. Iran's defense doctrine officially opposes the pursuit of nuclear weapons, but some factions in Iran are now openly calling for a change in this policy, following multiple Israeli strikes on its allies, particularly Hezbollah in Lebanon. Russia has historically been involved in Iran's nuclear program, including the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, but throughout the early 21st century and the 2010s, Russia repeatedly hindered progress, leading some in Iran to accuse Russia of being an unreliable partner. Moscow also delayed the delivery of the S-300 missile defense system between 2010 and 2016, as a result of Western sanctions against Tehran.

"Russia does not want Iran to have nuclear weapons...[this] would change the balance of power in the Middle East to the detriment of Russia's interests. For Russia, the best scenario is that Iran remains under sanctions and challenges the US and Europe over its nuclear program," said Amin Montazeri, foreign policy editor of Tehran's Hammihan Daily. "If Russia is to cooperate in containing Iran, it may seek concessions from the US on the Ukraine issue," Montazeri added.

Geopolitical dynamics are always subject to change as local events change, as evidenced by Syria, and with no strong ideological ties beyond an anti-US strategy, the relationship between Iran and Russia could break down. Turkey's opposition to and cooperation with Iran and Russia can be seen as a sign of the changing nature of alliances.

In December 2024, with the collapse of the Assad regime, the foreign ministers of Turkey, Iran, and Russia met during the Doha Forum in Qatar. This trilateral meeting was held under the Astana Process, a diplomatic initiative aimed at managing the conflict in Syria, in which Russia and Iran are guarantors on the regime side, and Turkey is a guarantor on the opposition side. Astana provided an opportunity for the three major powers to cooperate on security goals in Syria, even though they supported different camps. But for most of the process, Turkey has been in a weaker position, given Assad's perceived de facto victory in the war.

Now the situation has changed, and Turkey's long-standing support for the former opposition has put it in a favorable position in its relations with Iran and Russia, and has become a channel of influence over Damascus. Omer Ozkizilcik, director of Turkish studies at the Istanbul-based Omran Strategic Studies Center, said this is a new reality they must adapt to. "Iran, while clearly at a disadvantage, will have to adapt to the new reality and establish some form of relationship with the new Syrian government," Ozkizilcik said, referring to the fact that the Assad regime had almost completely allowed Iran to operate within Syria.

As for Russia, while it hopes to retain its bases in Syria, it is hedging against the new reality by partially shifting to Libya, where Russia has close ties with the eastern government based in Benghazi, and Russian cargo planes have repeatedly flown to its base in al-Khadim. On the other hand, Iran appears to have retreated to Iraq to consolidate its position. There are reports that Iran has pushed its allies in Iraq to stop firing rockets and drones at Israel, which could lead to attacks on its positions by the US and Israel.

In this context, Iran is likely to strengthen its influence in Iraq, "which is the last pillar of Iran's Axis of Resistance," Montazeri said. Iraq is now both a financial resource and a defensive buffer for Tehran, which relies on the country for economic support under sanctions. Saeed Emian, co-founder of the Tehran Governance and Policy Institute, said that Iran has a history of adapting to changing geopolitical dynamics and is able to withstand any changes and maintain its relationship with Russia.

However, regardless of any agreement reached between Russia and the US after Trump takes office, the Iranian leadership does not believe that Putin will fundamentally change his strategic direction towards Iran. "Putin is well aware of the deep-seated anti-Russian sentiment within US and European institutions," Emian said. "In the past three years, Russia has faced what it perceives as an existential challenge from the West...Putin seems unlikely to risk losing long-term allies, especially those who have proven loyal in key moments, such as in Syria and Crimea," Emian added.