Will Iran build a nuclear bomb while Trump is in power in the US?

2025-01-12 00:13:00

Abstract: Trump's potential term threatens Iran, possibly sparking military action. Iran considers nuclear weapons. JCPOA renegotiation is possible, but depends on US stance.

Analysts believe that a second US presidential term for Donald Trump portends a difficult path for Iran, potentially leading to different outcomes in its relationship with the West. The US leadership, along with Israel, has been openly discussing the possibility of military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities and key infrastructure, including power plants, oil, and petrochemical facilities.

Iranian leaders, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, have maintained a hardline stance. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has conducted large-scale military exercises, primarily focused on defending sensitive sites. For over two decades, Iran's relationship with the West has largely been defined by the development of its nuclear program and efforts to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons. Tehran has consistently maintained that it is not seeking weapons of mass destruction.

Recently, high-ranking Iranian political and military officials have been discussing whether to alter Tehran's official policy of not pursuing nuclear weapons, given the increasing security threats. There appear to be two viewpoints in Tehran: one leaning towards engagement with the US, including on the nuclear program, and another advocating for the pursuit of nuclear weapons, particularly given the perceived weakening of deterrence against Israel and setbacks suffered by its regional allies. Nathan Rathi, a senior Iran analyst at the Crisis Group in Washington, noted, "But if the former view prevails, it still requires Washington's willingness to engage with Tehran – and given the Iranian Islamic Republic's vulnerability, Washington might be more inclined to put greater pressure on the regime rather than accept concessions to it."

With the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria and setbacks to its "axis of resistance" throughout the region, Iran has lost one of the pillars of its forward defense strategy. The country is also struggling under the weight of extensive sanctions, negatively impacting its already troubled economy, plummeting national currency, high inflation, and energy crisis. Amidst the dire economic situation, the government of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian appears to be seeking further engagement with the West, with plans to send diplomats to Europe later this month for talks with the E3 group consisting of France, Germany, and the UK.

The general framework currently under discussion appears similar to the 2015 nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Iran struck with world powers, involving limiting Iran's nuclear program in exchange for easing some of Iran's economic pressure. However, no new framework has been formed, and any talks so far appear to be consultations aimed at clarifying viewpoints. This contrasts with the years of negotiations between Iran and the West that preceded the nuclear deal. In 2018, Trump abandoned the JCPOA and imposed harsh sanctions on Iran. He also ordered the assassination of Qassem Soleimani, a senior Iranian general and key architect of its regional axis.

Ellie Geranmayeh, Deputy Director of the Middle East and North Africa program at the European Council on Foreign Relations, stated, "Unlike Trump's first administration, the Europeans will be more inclined towards whatever policy the US chooses because in recent years, due to their increasing tensions with Tehran, the Europeans have somewhat endorsed the maximum pressure campaign." Abbas Aslani, a senior research fellow at the Center for Middle East Strategic Studies, told Al Jazeera that there should be significant developments this year that will better illuminate the direction of Iran's nuclear program. Aslani said that several clauses of the JCPOA have expired, making people more willing to negotiate new understandings, especially given that the JCPOA's major sunset clause, which allows the West to reinstate any UN sanctions on Iran (snapback), expires in October 2025.

Geranmayeh stated that the E3 group views the snapback mechanism as a last resort they can use to restrain Iran, realizing that its use could trigger "a series of very unpredictable escalatory events." Therefore, Europe will use the remaining time before October to prevent escalation and push for diplomacy. However, it remains a major question how the Europeans will respond if Trump demands that the E3 group immediately impose snapback sanctions on Iran in exchange for concessions on transatlantic issues involving European security.

Aslani said, "We are heading towards either a significant escalation of tensions or some sort of limited agreement on the nuclear program, depending on whether Iran and the US can reach some kind of understanding." Direct negotiations between Tehran and Washington are also possible, but Iran has refused to do so because of the US's unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA. He said, "If the Trump administration tries to exert too much pressure to gain concessions, it will be difficult to reach an agreement even if there is a broader understanding." The latest information indicates that Iran has not yet begun manufacturing a nuclear bomb.

However, a year after Trump's withdrawal from the JCPOA, Iran began increasing its levels of uranium enrichment and the number of centrifuges, repeating the process after Israeli attacks on its nuclear facilities and international condemnation. In recent months, in response to another resolution condemning Iran passed by the West at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) board meeting, Iran installed thousands of new centrifuges. Currently, Iran is enriching uranium to 60%, a relatively short technical step away from the 90% plus needed to create a nuclear bomb, and the IAEA reports that Tehran possesses enough fissile material to create multiple bombs.

The Crisis Group's Rathi stated that the increased nuclear activity provides Iran with some leverage in negotiations with Trump, but it also carries considerable risk. "Tehran is enriching at near weapons-grade levels and with very little breakout time, blurring the line between a worrying and sufficiently alarming situation for the US and/or Israel to consider military action," he told Al Jazeera. Nuclear breakout time refers to the time needed to produce enough fissile material to create a nuclear bomb. If the decision is made to create a nuclear bomb, Iran would have to design and assemble the weapon, combine it with long-range missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, and successfully test it.

Senior analyst Geranmayeh believes that there is currently a short-term wait-and-see period, as the "elephant" of Trump taking office looms, but it is unclear how his administration plans to shape its relationship with Iran. Geranmayeh told Al Jazeera, "I don't think Iran is likely to significantly escalate its nuclear activity in the first few weeks of 2025 unless President Trump actively doubles down on the maximum pressure campaign." She added that Iran's nuclear activity might slightly cool down if the US prioritizes diplomatic negotiations aimed at de-escalating the situation, meaning that two very different scenarios are possible in the future depending on Trump's position.