Israel's military publishes first report on 7 October 2023 failures

2025-02-28 06:01:00

Abstract: IDF report admits failure to protect civilians in the Oct 7 Hamas attack, citing intelligence & operational shortcomings and misjudging Hamas.

The Israeli military has released its first official report detailing the reasons for its failures in the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack that triggered the Gaza war. The report explicitly states that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) "failed to fulfill its mission to protect Israeli civilians." This admission highlights the severity of the intelligence and operational shortcomings that led to the devastating event.

The 19-page report covers known information about the catastrophic events that resulted in the deaths of approximately 1,200 people. Around 5,000 militants from Hamas and other Palestinian groups infiltrated Israel and abducted 251 hostages. While not containing startling new revelations, the report's written acknowledgment of the military's misjudgment of Hamas's intentions and underestimation of its capabilities is a sobering assessment. The official documentation of these failures underscores the need for systemic changes within the IDF.

The report notes that the military viewed Gaza as a secondary security threat, prioritizing Iran and Hezbollah. Its policy toward Gaza was "contradictory: Hamas is illegitimate, but no effort was made to develop an alternative." The military chose a "conflict management" approach to dealing with Gaza and believed that Hamas had "neither the interest nor the readiness for a large-scale war," a perception reinforced by Hamas's own deceptive tactics. This miscalculation led to a critical underestimation of the threat posed by Hamas.

The report also points out that evidence from 2018 onward indicated that Hamas (designated as a terrorist organization by Israel, the United States, the United Kingdom, and other countries) was indeed developing an ambitious plan, but this evidence was interpreted as "unrealistic or infeasible," reflecting "Hamas's long-term aspirations rather than an actionable threat." Although, in the months leading up to the war, military intelligence began to form a new assessment that Hamas's plan was more than just a vision but a "concrete framework for action planning," this emerging assessment did not gain the attention of senior military intelligence officials. This failure to recognize and act on the evolving threat landscape had dire consequences.

The report reveals a widespread complacency within the military regarding Hamas's intentions and how to address the threat it posed. "There was no in-depth discussion of the question: What if we are wrong?" the report states. Over time, "a significant and persistent gap emerged between the intelligence assessment of Hamas and reality." The report also emphasizes that the military's "in-depth knowledge of the enemy's different worldview (including its culture, religion, language, and history) has declined." The report calls for a profound reform of the intelligence culture, "fostering intellectual openness, skepticism, listening, learning, debate, and constructive disagreement." These changes are essential to prevent future intelligence failures.

The report states that the desire to protect high-value intelligence sources led the military to fail to raise the alert level immediately before October 7. The Gaza Division was "effectively overwhelmed for several hours" on October 7, severely impairing its ability to understand the situation and respond effectively. The Air Force responded quickly, but there were "significant difficulties in distinguishing between IDF soldiers, civilians, and terrorists." The report also notes that, in some incidents, wounded soldiers were evacuated before civilians. These operational shortcomings exacerbated the chaos and casualties of the attack.

After presenting the findings to commanders on Monday, outgoing IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi stated that he takes full responsibility for the failures. "I bear my responsibility. It's my responsibility. On October 7, I was the commander of the army, and I bear the responsibility, and I also bear its consequences. I think that's also my responsibility. And I think that in every one of my mistaken commands, there is also a part of my own responsibility," he said in a video statement. Last month, the general announced his resignation due to these failures and called for a commission of inquiry to conduct a broader investigation to help prevent future attacks. His willingness to accept accountability is a crucial step towards rebuilding trust and ensuring future preparedness.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has not yet acknowledged any responsibility for the events of October 7, stating that such a national investigation should wait until after the war. His critics accuse Netanyahu of being unwilling to admit any personal fault. Israel responded to the October 7 attack by launching airstrikes and ground operations in Gaza, during which at least 48,365 people have been killed, according to the Hamas-controlled health ministry in the region. The ongoing conflict underscores the devastating consequences of the initial failures and the urgent need for comprehensive reforms.